humor during this "school-sponsored" and "school-supervised" event proved 3 to be an unwise decision, as his fourteen-foot banner was confiscated and he was suspended for ten days. Apparently, the school principal, and presumably 4 many others, did not find anything funny in Frederick's cryptic banner.
The student speech concerns implicated by the banner, however, were much more important than understanding this particular high school student's sense of humor. Joseph Frederick's unfurling of his "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" banner was the subject of one of the Supreme Court's most high-profile cases in 2006. Not surprisingly, Frederick's banner, which was self-proclaimed by 5 Frederick as being "meaningless and funny," quickly became a banner 6 containing speech fraught with importance. The combination of Morse v. Frederick's unique factual background and the unpredictable state of student speech law at the time offered hope that the Supreme Court would soon make students' speech rights more certain. The Court's narrow holding in Morse, however, seems to have left school administrations, students, and lower courts in no different a situation than the one they were in before the ruling. The importance of this apparent lack of guidance from the Court cannot be authority, leading to either a lack of order and discipline in schools or unnecessary censorship of speech. Careful review of recent student speech 11 cases decided after Morse reveals that courts remain unsure about Tinker's scope and the extent of Fraser and Kuhlmeier's application. An appropriate interpretation, however, of the Court's majority opinion and Justice Alito's concurring opinion in Morse provides more guidance than recent court decisions may demonstrate. Morse explicitly reaffirms the principle that students maintain First Amendment rights, and rejects the argument that 12 student speech is proscribable simply because it is plainly "offensive." In 13 addition, Justice Alito's concurring opinion rejects the propriety of extending Fraser and Kuhlmeier's exceptions to Tinker to include student speech contrary to the school's educational mission. prior student speech cases. Part III will briefly describe lower courts' inconsistent application of Supreme Court precedent, highlighting the need for extracting guidance from the Court's opinion in Morse. Part IV will closely examine and analyze Chief Justice Roberts' majority opinion and Justice Alito's concurring opinion in Morse and explain how the Court's decision alters the student speech landscape. Additionally, Part IV of this Note will focus on decisions in recent student speech cases that have applied the Supreme Court's decision in Morse. Part IV will argue, in the context of these recent cases, for the proper application of student speech law in light of the Court's holding in Morse. Finally, Part V concludes.
II. PRIOR SUPREME COURT STUDENT SPEECH CASES
The Morse Court relied on three Supreme Court student speech cases:
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, Bethel School

16
District No. 403 v. Fraser, and Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier. 17 18 Although the Court in Morse ultimately applied a standard different from those articulated in Tinker, Fraser, and Kuhlmeier, familiarity with these cases is essential to understanding the ramifications of the Morse opinion.
A. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District
In Tinker, a group of adults and students agreed to demonstrate their objections to the war Vietnam War by wearing black armbands. The 19 principals of the relevant schools became aware of the plan and adopted a policy that banned such a demonstration. Nevertheless, three students 20 decided to don the armbands to exhibit their opposition to the war. All three 21 students were promptly suspended from school. The students filed suit, 22 alleged First Amendment violations, and sought an injunction preventing the school district from disciplining the students for wearing black armbands. court and appellate court upheld the constitutionality of the school district's action.
24
Justice Fortas, delivering the opinion of the Court, disagreed with the courts below. He reasoned that "[i]t can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." In developing this point, however, Justice Fortas 25 emphasized that the First Amendment rights available to students must be "applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment."
26
Even so, the Court argued that too much deference to school administrators would endanger students' First Amendment rights. Thus, the so-called 27 Tinker standard implied that although school officials must be able to regulate some student speech, their authority cannot operate unfettered. Tinker established that while the First Amendment does not protect student speech and conduct that "materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others," a "mere desire to avoid the 28 discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint" is not enough to overcome a student's right to freedom of expression. This distinction makes clear that students cannot be limited 29 solely to expression of views officially approved by the school.
30
Consequently, the wearing of black armbands in Tinker fell within the confines of protected student speech as expressed by Justice Fortas. The 31 Court held that the students' armbands were a passive expression of opinion that threatened no disorder or disturbance and did not intrude upon the work of the school or the rights of other students. Furthermore, the Court held that 32 the school's action appeared to be predicated on avoiding the controversy that might result from the students' expression. As a result, the Supreme Court 33 reversed the appellate court's decision and held the school's prohibition on armbands to be unconstitutional. 34 
2009]
STUDENT SPEECH AFTER MORSE v. FREDERICK 147 35. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677 (1986) . 36. Id. at 677-78. Fraser described his candidate as being "a man who is firm-he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt, his character is firm-but most of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm." Id. at 687 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Fraser also said that his candidate was "a man who takes his point and pounds it in" and "a man who will go to the very end-even the climax, for each and every one of you." Id. The Supreme Court reasoned that a political message displayed via an armband was entirely different from sexually explicit speech. In evaluating 40 the role and purpose of public schools, the Court determined that one objective of public education is to inculcate students with "fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system." Therefore, 41 the freedom to advocate unpopular views in school must be balanced against the equally important interest of teaching students to engage in "socially appropriate behavior." Prohibiting students from using vulgar and offensive 42 terms in public discourse was considered by the Court to be encompassed within public education's function of teaching appropriate behavior. Circuit therefore held that the school violated the students' First Amendment rights by censoring the newspaper.
58
The Supreme Court, on the other hand, specifically distinguished the facts in Kuhlmeier from those in Tinker. In doing so, the Court explained that the question of whether the First Amendment requires a school to tolerate student speech is different from whether the First Amendment requires a school to endorse student speech. The first question concerns educators' abilities to 59 regulate a student's personal expression that takes place on school premises, while the second question addresses educators' authority over school-sponsored publications and other expressive activities that the public might "reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school." Educators, S. 675 (1986) . After Kuhlmeier, any student speech that can possibly be viewed as "bearing the school's imprimatur," can also be controlled by the school. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) .
67. See generally Bar-Navon v. Sch. Bd. of Brevard County, Fla., No. 6:06-cv-1434 -Orl-19KRS, 2007 WL 3284322, at *5-6 (M.D. Fla. 2007 ) (highlighting the disagreement among the Circuit Courts of Appeal as to whether Tinker applies to all regulation of student speech or only to viewpoint-based no violation of First Amendment rights occurred when the principal decided to delete two pages of the school newspaper.
65
The Supreme Court's decisions in Fraser and Kuhlmeier changed the student speech landscape. Tinker, and its general rule providing broad protection to student speech, no longer stood alone. The introduction of Fraser and Kuhlmeier allowed courts to reevaluate the amount of discretion a school official has in punishing objectionable student speech. On one hand, some courts seemed to take the view that Fraser and Kuhlmeier significantly cut into Tinker's rule. To these courts, the reasoning underlying the Court's decision in Fraser and Kuhlmeier provided additional avenues for censorship of student speech. In fact, some courts even questioned whether Tinker was still applicable after the Court's subsequent student speech cases. On the other hand, many courts approached Fraser and Kuhlmeier as narrow exceptions to Tinker's general rule. Nonetheless, two results are certain from the Court's opinions in Fraser and Kuhlmeier. First, there are additional ways a school can lawfully silence speech other than requiring a substantial disruption of school activities. Second, lower courts are unsure as to the proper 66 application of student speech precedent.
III. LOWER COURTS' INCONSISTENT APPLICATION OF SUPREME COURT
PRECEDENT AND THE NEED FOR GUIDANCE Lower courts' inability to consistently apply Supreme Court student speech precedent was a motiviating factor for the Court to grant certiorari to Morse. Lower courts have been unable to apply the general rule articulated in Tinker with any desirable degree of consistency, and the lower courts' application of Fraser and Kuhlmeier's exceptions to Tinker's general rule has proven to be even more unpredictable and contradictory.
Although Tinker stands for the proposition that schools may not regulate student speech unless the speech results in a reasonable fear of or an actual substantial disruption of school activities, courts remain undecided about the scope of Tinker's holding. Undoubtedly, the unique facts of Ct. 2618 Ct. , 2627 Ct. (2007 . 72. Determining whether Fraser is merely an exception to Tinker's "substantial disruption" test, or whether Fraser stands for the much broader proposition that schools may censor speech contrary to the school's educational mission, is important to understanding the scope of Tinker. If Fraser is read as a narrow exception to Tinker, then it seems as though the "substantial disruption" test should apply to all student speech, subject, of course, to the exceptions in Fraser (vulgar, lewd, or obscene speech) and Kuhlmeier (school sponsored speech or speech that may reasonably be viewed as bearing the school's imprimatur). On the other hand, if lower courts read Fraser as permitting regulation of student speech contrary to a school's educational mission, it seems as though Tinker's "substantial disruption" test could only be reconciled to this broad rule by limiting it to political speech or speech that implicates concerns at the heart of the First Amendment.
73. See, e.g., Boroff v. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465, 470 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding, under Fraser, that a student could not wear Marilyn Manson t-shirts because they contained "symbols and to some of the confusion; the school policy at issue in Tinker was a viewpoint-based regulation developed in order to censor controversial political speech. The disagreement, therefore, focuses on whether there "should be a 68 distinction between school speech regulation that is viewpoint-hostile and school conduct regulation that only incidentally burdens student expression." 69 In other words, it is not clear whether Tinker applies to all student speech not sponsored by schools, subject to the rule of Fraser, or whether it applies solely to political speech or to political viewpoint-based discrimination. This 70 uncertainty makes it difficult for school officials to comprehend the limitations on their authority in enforcing content-neutral rules and regulations.
Much of the confusion surrounding the scope of shirts. The court held that all shirts representing this particular rock singer 82 (regardless of the words and symbols on the shirts) were vulgar, offensive, and contrary to the educational mission of the school. The court's decision was 83 based on the school principal's statement that wearing this particular rock singer's t-shirts could be considered as approving of the views espoused by the rock singer, and these views are inconsistent with the school's mission.
84
Expanding on Fraser's holding, the Sixth Circuit held that the content of a student's speech, rather than just the manner of delivery, is subject to school regulation. Predictably, this interpretation of Fraser substantially carves into Tinker's general rule that students do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech at the schoolhouse gate." Under this interpretation of Fraser, 85 students' freedom of speech is subject to the personal preferences and views of school officials. The student's speech or expression need not be vulgar or obscene in order to be proscribed. Rather, any speech containing content deemed contrary to the school's educational mission would be subject to regulation.
The confusion produced by these inconsistent applications of Supreme Court student speech precedent has created a situation where guidance is desperately needed. It is likely that uncertainty in this particular area has contributed to some of our public schools' problems and shortcomings. Although it is unrealistic to think the Supreme Court's decision in Morse answered all the questions surrounding student speech law, a proper interpretation of the Court's decision provides more answers than some recent student speech cases demonstrate.
IV. MORSE V. FREDERICK: SOME GUIDANCE AND RECENT ATTEMPTS AT APPLICATION
A. Factual and Procedural Background
On January 24, 2002, the Olympic Torch Relay passed through Juneau, Alaska. In the spirit of this historic event, the school principal of 
B. Justice Roberts' Majority Opinion
An early portion of Chief Justice Roberts' majority opinion in Morse is dedicated to deciphering the meaning of Frederick's banner. After evaluating 96 differing claims that "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" was gibberish, political or religious speech, or pro-drug speech, the Court determined that a pro-drug interpretation of the banner was the only plausible interpretation. With a 97 pro-drug interpretation of the banner serving as a background, the majority opinion framed the issue presented as "whether a principal may, consistent with the First Amendment, restrict student speech at a school event, when Justice Roberts reinforced that Tinker provides that student speech may not be suppressed unless school officials reasonably conclude it will "materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school."
100
In reexamining Tinker, Chief Justice Roberts highlighted the "stark" political nature of the speech and reminds the reader that political speech is "at the core of what the First Amendment is designed to protect." Next, the majority 101 opinion reexamined Fraser. As mentioned earlier in this Note, it is debatable whether Fraser permitted regulation of the student speech because of the content of the speech or its manner of delivery. The majority opinion in Morse documented the Fraser Court's ambiguous mode of analysis that has led to inconsistent applications of Fraser in lower courts. Chief Justice Roberts 102 explained the unclear mode of analysis employed in Fraser by highlighting the Fraser Court's shifting focus. According to Chief Justice Roberts, the Fraser Court initially seemed focused on the content of student speech in reaching its conclusion. This seemingly content-based approach was demonstrated in Fraser through the distinction made between the political message in Tinker and the sexual content of the speech in Fraser.
103
Nevertheless, Chief Justice Roberts pointed out that the Fraser Court also reasoned school officials have the authority to determine "what manner of speech in the classroom or in the school assembly is inappropriate." Such 104 a statement creates the belief the Fraser Court was more concerned with the manner of the speech than its content. In constructing a narrow majority opinion, however, Chief Justice Roberts held that resolution of this debate about Fraser was unnecessary. Instead, the majority held that it was enough 105 to extract two basic principles from the case. demonstrate that deterring drug use by schoolchildren has been recognized as an important and compelling interest. With these cases in mind, the majority 118 opinion established that student speech celebrating drug use, such as Frederick's "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" banner, poses a significant challenge for school officials attempting to protect students from the dangers of drug abuse. As a result, the majority constructed a rule that it hopes will ease the 119 burden school officials face in confronting the dangers of illegal drug abuse. Adding another exception to Tinker's general rule, the Court held that "[t]he 'special characteristics of the school environment' and the governmental interest in stopping student drug abuse . . . allow schools to restrict student expression that they reasonably regard as promoting illegal drug use."
120
Because the Court determined Frederick's banner could reasonably be regarded as promoting illegal drug use, the Court held that Frederick's First Amendment rights were not infringed upon when the principal confiscated the banner and punished Frederick for its continued display.
121
C. Justice Alito's Concurring Opinion
Justice Alito's concurring opinion (joined by Justice Kennedy) merits attention because it limits an already limited majority opinion. Because it provides the narrowest discussion provided by a Justice whose vote was necessary for the majority, the concurrence seems to provide the controlling legal rule. Although Justices Alito and Kennedy joined the five-member 122 majority, they did so only on the understanding that the majority opinion went no further "than to hold that a public school may restrict speech that a reasonable observer would interpret as advocating illegal drug use" and "it provide [d] Moreover, Justices Alito and Kennedy joined the majority opinion on the understanding that the majority opinion does not hold that the special characteristics of the public schools necessarily justify any other speech restrictions not already recognized in the Court's holdings. Justice Alito 124 elaborated on this point by explaining his understanding of the Supreme Court holdings in student speech cases. According to Justice Alito, Tinker only permits regulation of student speech that threatens a substantial disruption of the school environment, Fraser allows "regulation of speech that is delivered in a lewd or vulgar manner," and Kuhlmeier permits a school to regulate speech that is essentially the school's own speech. In addition, Justice Alito 125 believed the decision in the present case, Morse, only permitted restriction of speech advocating illegal drug use.
126
Justice Alito maintained that the opinion of the Court did not endorse the argument that the First Amendment allows school officials to regulate any student speech that interfered with a school's educational mission. Justice
127
Alito found it of utmost importance to reject this argument before it could be "manipulated in dangerous ways." In explaining the danger inherent in the 128 "educational mission" argument, Justice Alito wrote:
The "educational mission" of the public schools is defined by the elected and appointed public officials with authority over the schools and by the school administrators and faculty. As a result, some public schools have defined their educational missions as including the inculcation of whatever political and social views are held by the members of these groups.
129
The "educational mission" argument, Justice Alito reasoned, strikes at the very core of the First Amendment because it gives school officials authorization to stifle student speech on political and social issues based solely on disagreement with the viewpoint expressed.
130
Justice Alito, therefore, concluded that any argument for limiting student speech cannot rest on a theory of delegation but must be based on the special characteristics of a school setting. In this case, the special characteristic is ) ("Under Fraser, then, schools are generally held to have the authority to censor on-campus speech that school authorities consider to be vulgar, offensive, or otherwise contrary to the school's mission to 'inculcate the habits and manners of civility' without the need to show a 'substantial disruption' under Tinker." (internal citations omitted)), aff 'd, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008 ), with Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 599 (W.D. Pa. 2007 ) (pointing out that although the Fraser Court noted that school officials may punish student speech that undermines the school's educational mission, Justice Alito's concurrence in Morse clarifies that student speech may not be censored "under the rubric of 'interference with the educational mission' because that term can be easily manipulated").
135. Pounds v. Katy Indep. Sch. Dist., 517 F. Supp. 2d 901, 913 (S.D. Tex. 2007 ) (quoting Canady v. Bossier, 240 F.3d 437, 443 (5th Cir. 2001 ).
136. Bar-Navon v. Sch. Bd. of Brevard County, 2007 WL 3284322, at *7 (M.D. Fla. 2007 ) (refusing to apply the Tinker standard to a mandatory school uniform policy, but instead opting to apply the time, place, and manner balancing test to the content-neutral regulation). the threat to the physical safety of students. Because Justices Alito and 132 Kennedy believed illegal drug use presented a very serious and unique threat to the physical safety of students, they concluded schools could prohibit speech that advocates illegal drug use.
133
D. Analysis of Recent Attempts to Apply Student Speech Precedent after Morse
For the most part, recent applications of the Supreme Court's holding in Morse v. Frederick have not resolved the disputes surrounding the correct interpretation of Supreme Court student speech precedent. Courts continue to be unsure as to the proper scope of Tinker and have differed as to whether subsequent Supreme Court student speech decisions permit regulation of speech contrary to the educational mission of the school. A proper 134 interpretation of Morse, however, provides guidance.
The debate continues over whether Tinker's general rule applies to all student speech, subject to the exceptions set forth in Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse, or to student speech that is subject to content-based regulations. Some courts remain willing to abandon Tinker altogether when a content-neutral regulation is at stake. For instance, reaching its decision after the Morse opinion, a federal district court in Avoiding the "substantial disruption" standard, however, is not the only route courts have taken with content-neutral regulations. The Seventh Circuit recently demonstrated a willingness to weaken the "substantial disruption" test when a student challenges a content-neutral regulation. In Nuxoll v. Indian
137
Prairie School District, the Seventh Circuit, in evaluating whether a student could wear a t-shirt reading "Be Happy, Not Gay," looked to Morse and Fraser to infer that a school could forbid speech that "will lead to . . . symptoms of a sick school." Although the court held that "Be Happy, Not 138 Gay" was not negative enough to be censored, the court indicated a 139 willingness to permit the school to prohibit statements such as "homosexuals are going to Hell" or "homophobes are closeted homosexuals" under its general ban of derogatory comments. This opinion from the Seventh Circuit 140 is particularly notable for its reliance on Morse and Fraser in defining what is a "substantial disruption" when neither Morse nor Fraser applied Tinker's substantial disruption test. Relying on cases that did not apply the "substantial disruption" standard to articulate the scope of that standard is improper.
Courts are understandably eager to apply a different standard than "substantial disruption" to content-neutral regulations. Maintaining order and discipline in schools requires broad school policies unrelated to viewpoint and content, and reasonable people can disagree as to whether it is wise policy to subject even content-neutral school rules to a "substantial disruption" analysis. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has resolved this debate by being clear that the rule in Tinker, subject to a few exceptions, applies to all student speech regulations. The departure, therefore from Tinker's general rule, especially after the Court's decision in Morse, is misguided. Although the majority opinion in Morse does not explicitly address the issue, Justice Alito's concurring opinion seems to advise against the results reached by these courts. After all, he and Justice Kennedy only joined the Morse majority under the impression that the opinion did not provide that the special characteristics of a public school justify any other speech restrictions not already recognized in the Court's holdings in reasonably believe that Frederick's banner bore the school's imprimatur."). 148. It is possible that the court in Wolf could have avoided the First Amendment question entirely, and the court could have reached the same result without offering its questionable interpretation and application of student speech precedent. In addition to citing Kuhlmeier, the Wolf court cites to New Jersey v. T.L.O. for the proposition that courts should defer to the judgment of schools in the promulgation of rules forbidding specific conduct that school officials have determined to be "destructive of school order or of a proper educational environment." Wolf, 517 F. Supp. 2d at 1190 (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O. 469 U. S. 325, 342 n.9 (1985) ). The court should have stopped there. The distinction between conduct and speech in the school environment cannot be overemphasized, and it is unfortunate the court did not realize its importance. In Wolf, the court would have been justified in deferring to the school's regulation of sexual conduct, such as "French kissing, making out, and groping." Instead, the court predicated its deference to the school on an incomplete interpretation of Supreme Court student speech precedent because it was "not prepared to hold categorically that French kissing, making out, and groping are forms of conduct which the First Amendment does not protect." Id. at 1189. By assuming that such sexual conduct is "expressive conduct," the court entered into a flawed First Amendment analysis that needlessly confuses post-Morse student speech law.
149. Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 213 (D. Conn. 2007) , aff 'd, 527, F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008 guidance from the majority opinion as to the proper application of Fraser, Justice Alito's concurring opinion is instructive.
Although courts are not bound by Justice Alito's concurring opinion, it is somewhat perplexing how, after reading the opinion, a court would maintain that Fraser should be read to permit censorship of student speech that
